Padan.org - Le lingue, i loro dialetti e l'identità della Padania - Chechnya Asserts Its Independence By Working Within the System

A commonly heard view expressed by publications and experts representing various shades of the political spectrum is that in President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the only independent political actors are the president himself and his administration.
Public politics has ceased to exist, and the centralized vertical of power has put an end to regional dissent. This view reveals a distinctly ‘Moscow-centric’ approach typical of the Russian political analyst community. However, moving beyond the intrigues of Moscow politics, it becomes clear that Russia in fact does have its share of strong, consistent and independent political actors that do not look to the Kremlin for authority. Although they do not exist in official accounts, there are regional dissenters – but they are skillfully camouflaged by a veil of official loyalty to Moscow and to President Vladimir Putin personally. It is unclear, however, if this strength, consistency and independence strengthen Russian statehood or undermine it.

No one doubts that the Republic of Chechnya, Russia’s most problematic region, will get a new president this year. In his article “Chechnya Ruled By ‘Little Stalin’ Kadyrov,” Reuters correspondent Oliver Bullough described the future leader of the Chechens as follows: “Male, aged 29, wears a beard, calls his troops into battle in the name of Allah, speaks Russian with a strong Chechen accent. Not so long ago this would have read like the description of one of Moscow’s most sworn enemies, but while his former comrades in arms are hopping around the mountains, hiding from Russian soldiers, Ramzan Kadyrov is a Hero of Russia, frequent guest of President Vladimir Putin and regional leader of the pro-Kremlin political party.” Kadyrov will turn 30 in October, thus giving him the legal right to be named head of the republic. Now that direct elections of regional leaders have been abolished, a reshuffle of this kind is just an administrative formality.

As prime minister, Kadyrov is formally number two in Chechnya’s power hierarchy. But he is not waiting for his birthday to show everyone, including the Kremlin, who really is the boss. On May 5, Putin met with Kadyrov and Chechen President Alu Alkhanov, to discuss the growing internal dispute between the two leaders. According to Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, Kadyrov’s entourage is already pressing Alkhanov to resign. The conflict between Alkhanov and Kadyrov is not just a personal power struggle. It was built into the system put in place by the federal authorities right from the start, and has resulted in a dual power structure – on one side, a formal president without authority and influence; and on the other, Kadyrov, son of late Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov, who has almost completely privatized power in Chechnya over the last two years. It is Kadyrov, and not Alkhanov, who gives expression to political ideas such as settling border disputes between Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia in favor of Chechnya, or of expelling Danish human rights activists from the republic.

A month ago, Kadyrov issued a firm statement regarding the Southern Federal District Chief Interior Ministry Department’s Search and Operations Bureau No. 2, whom he accused of illegally detaining Chechens. Kadyrov said that he would ensure that this bureau, part of a federal agency, would be expelled from Chechnya. Almost at the same time as this statement was made, the reconnaissance detachment of the 45th Paratroops reconnaissance regiment, carrying out missions as part of the combined forces in the North Caucasus, was withdrawn from Chechnya.

The killing over the weekend of separatist leader Abdul-Kalim Sadulayev has also been presented as a victory for Kadyrov, rather than the Russian leadership or security services who carried out the attack, further proof that Kadyrov is, indeed, the sole master of the republic.

Kadyrov’s latest statements and actions, like those of his supporter Dukvakh Abdurakhmanov, head of the Chechen parliament, are links in a chain that can be called the Chechenization of power. This process involves transferring control to a local elite proclaiming itself pro-Russian. In November 2005, the local elite in Chechnya scored an important political victory by holding elections to a regional parliament, and thus legitimizing this process of “Chechenization.” This year has so far seen them consolidate this political success.

It was Akhmad Kadyrov who launched the policy of Chechenization. During the first Chechen war, Kadyrov was a mufti of the rebel republic and declared a jihad against the Russian infidels. Subsequent disputes between Kadyrov’s brand of “traditional” Islam, and proponents of a “renewed” Islam, brought this opportunist politician into the Russian camp, where he was well received.

In March 2003, a constitutional referendum was held in Chechnya, contradicting the Russian Constitution and numerous federal laws. The new Chechen constitution contained references to the republic’s sovereignty and called its residents “citizens of Chechnya.” The referendum was quickly followed by Akhmad Kadyrov’s election as president. After this, the appetite of the “pro-Russian” elite began to grow with every passing hour. First came demands to compensate residents of the republic for opportunities lost by not being able to take part in the privatization of assets in the early 1990s. These demands were followed by calls for fiscal independence and minimum federal presence. At the same time, Kadyrov engaged in independent dialogue with separatists and followed a policy of amnesty with regard to such notorious figures as Magomed Khambiev, separatist president Djokhar Dudayev’s former defense minister. At that time, Ramzan Kadyrov did no more than play the part of a “worthy son of a great father.”

But Akhmad Kadyrov’s assassination on the viewing stand at a Victory Day parade on May 9th 2004, raised the possibility of bringing Russian policy in Chechnya back to square one. The Kremlin had the opportunity to abandon Chechenization as an ineffective political instrument, using Kadyrov’s death as a pretext. But the Moscow authorities chose a different tactic. Moscow’s aims, objectives and motives had not changed significantly over that time, and so the policy of Chechenization not only continued but, at the end of 2005, was taken to its logical conclusion. The task fell to Ramzan Kadyrov to complete the edifice his father had begun.

Kadyrov’s greatest political victory was undoubtedly the parliamentary election of November 27th 2005, which effectively legitimized Chechenization. Kadyrov was named prime minister, a post traditionally occupied by ethnic Russians, and began making a whole series of economic demands, including the creation of a free economic zone and a preferential share of oil revenues. Finally, the republic’s authorities began tackling the most sensitive issue – the presence of the federal authority in the republic. The sizeable federal presence limited the regional elite’s wealth – especially in the case of federal law enforcement and military personnel – preventing Kadyrov and his entourage from enjoying the full benefits of sovereignty, as guaranteed by the Chechen constitution of 2003.

After some negotiations, it was agreed that Russian state military units stationed in Chechnya –the 42nd Division of the Defense Ministry and the 46th Interior Troops Brigade of the Interior Ministry – should be manned with local recruits. This development took the Chechenization of power to a new level. Now, local officials have taken control not only of the parliament and the republic’s presidential administration, but they also command the law enforcement agencies that are supposed to enforce federal laws in the regions. In other words, the Chechen elite is squeezing the federal authorities out. With the Chechenization of the military and law enforcement personnel, the Kremlin has no effective resources in the republic. The loss of both federal military and political influence in the region will effectively transform the republic from a constituent region of the Russian Federation into a Russian dominion.

Ramzan Kadyrov is essentially a separatist, but his is a more subtle, political kind of separatism. Kadyrov’s line is one of systemic separatism, as opposed to the anti-systemic separatism of the republic’s mountain regions. At the heart of this policy lies a deeply rational calculation of available resources. Kadyrov realizes that fighting Moscow to the last Chechen for the sake of ethnic-nationalist slogans is not to his advantage. It would make him a marginal figure with unclear prospects. Being president of a republic under Russian jurisdiction promises far greater benefits – first among them stable federal financing. Secondly, this situation offers the advantageous independence to run things in the republic while benefiting from the Kremlin’s administrative help in fighting opponents, who could easily be labeled enemies of the power vertical, and of Vladimir Putin personally. Thirdly, it projects a better image to the world at large. The perception of Chechen freedom fighters was seriously damaged after Beslan, but a person fighting for peace within the republic, a defender of the unity of the peoples of the Caucasus and representative of local power, not Russian imperial rule, is quite a different matter. This kind of person would have the opportunity to take part in prestigious international gatherings and build up international contacts. And finally, should the Kremlin ever decide to review the conditions of its agreement with the local elite, the Chechen leaders will be able to appeal to the international community, saying that a genuinely democratic and non-separatist regime is being oppressed by Russian imperialism.

Funt: World Press Review Russia Profile Sergei Markedonov is the head of the Department for Inter-ethnic Relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, in Moscow.